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I will describe a paradox which arises assuming it is possible to distinguish
machines from non-machines. In the “fly on the wall” version of the Turing
Test, player A passively observes the dialog of players B and C. Player A’s
goal is to determine whether B is a machine and whether C is a machine. For
simplicity, remove C from the game. Let A observe B as B recites a monologue,
and let A try to determine whether or not that recitation is computable.
I further modify the Test as follows. Player A guesses the nature of B after
every new line. The Test runs forever and A wins if his guesses are eventually
always correct: he is allowed finitely many wrong guesses. This is justified
because every finite string is computable, so no finite speech can rule out a
machine; any finite enunciation can be canned. Only an infinite one has a
chance of non-computability. Further, the Test is run by an Operator who
delivers B’s lines to A.
Suppose Player B is a human trying to appear human and that A can distin-
guish machines from non-machines. Without further caveats, A will eventually
detect B is non-machine and A’s guesses will converge to the correct answer.
But suppose the Operator is mischievous. If A most recently guessed that
B is non-machine, the Operator will lie and tell A that B said “Wait,” storing
what B really said. Only if A incorrectly guessed B was a machine does the
Operator let the real monologue go on. What will happen to A’s guesses?
When A believes B is a machine, the Operator presents the correct lines from
B. Eventually, A will realize from these lines that B is non-machine, and will
correct himself. This causes the operator to begin lying, and as far as A knows,
B begins saying “Wait” repeatedly. A Turing Machine can produce any finite
speech followed by “Wait” forever, so A will eventually think B is a machine.
This process continues, causing A to change his mind infinitely often.
But no machine can generate the lines A sees: if they are computable, they
remain computable with all “Wait”s removed, meaning B’s genuine lines are
computable, contradicting that they’re supposed to be distinguishable from a
machine. The lines which A is told are not mechanical and A eventually realizes
so, and stops changing his mind. This contradicts the previous paragraph.
This is a special case of a more general paper. In Alexander (2011: On Guess-
ing Whether a Sequence has a Certain Property, http://www.cs.uwaterloo.ca/
journals/JIS/VOL14/Alexander/alex2.pdf, J. of Integer Sequences, 1–11) I show
that a set S of sequences of naturals is “guessable” (in a sense like the above)
if and only if S can be defined in a ∀x∃y way and also in an ∃x∀y way. If S
is the set of Turing computable sequences, then S can be defined in an ∃x∀y
way: f : N → N is computable iff ∃x∀y f(y) = φx(y). But S cannot be defined
in any ∀x∃y way, so S is nonguessable.
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